题目：Coin Offering and Security Regulation
Abstract： We present a model that rationalizes the use of initial coin offerings (ICOs), in which a company raises funds by pre-selling access to a later product or service. We demonstrate two mechanisms by which ICOs create value: First, they aggregate dispersed signals about project quality, harnessing the "wisdom of the crowd". Second, they solve a coordination problem inherent in many projects with network effects, where there is strategic complementarity in the participation of consumers. Through either of these mechanisms, ICOs increase project value and facilitate investment of positive NPV projects. We apply our results to the current debate on the efficiency and optimal regulatory treatment of ICOs.
Jiasun Li is an assistant professor of finance at George Mason University. He received his Ph.D in finance from UCLA Anderson School of Management and B.S. in mathematics from Fudan University (Shanghai, China). His main research interest focuses on the interaction between blockchain, crowdfunding, and smart contract. He has presented his research at many prestigious institutions and conferences including MIT, Michigan, Northwestern, Yale, NBER, WFA, and Econometric Society. He is a winner of 2016 Yihong Xia Best paper award at CICF and 2014 CQA academic paper competition. He is also a frequent speaker for investment professionals.
美国乔治梅森大学金融学助理教授李家荪，在洛杉矶加州大学（UCLA）获金融学博士并在复旦大学获数学学士。李家荪博士的研究兴趣主要在区块链、众筹、代币发行等金融科技领域。他曾在包括麻省理工、密歇根、西北、耶鲁、美国国家经济研究局、西部金融协会、计量经济协会等诸多顶尖学府及高级别会议报告研究成果。他的研究曾获得2016中国国际金融年会夏一红最优论文奖及2014年芝加哥量化金融协会最优学术论文奖。李家荪博士也经常为投资界专业人士讲授。
时间：2017年10月11日（周三）16:00-17:30
返回顶部
