主题：Timely Persuasion

主讲：周臻，清华大学

时间：2019年10月17日 14:00-15:30

地点：半岛·体育bob官方网站614会议室

摘要：This paper proposes a simple dynamic information disclosure policy that eliminates panic. A panic occurs when some agents take an undesirable action (attack) because they fear that others will do the same, and thus, causing a regime change, even though it was not warranted. We consider a mass of privately informed agents who can attack a regime anytime within a time window. Attack is irreversible, delayed attack is costly, and the delay cost is continuous. We propose a policy called ``disaster alert”, which at a given date publicly discloses whether the regime is going to change regardless of what the agents do. We show that a timely alert persuades the agents to wait for the alert and not attack if the alert is not triggered, regardless of their private information, and thus, eliminates panic. We demonstrate how to apply this theory to prevent capital outflows from an emerging economy.